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but the delivery is. Or it can mean pure e-missives, i.e. electronic documents with
electronic signatures. No paper, no ink. Seemingly the profession wants e-missives,14
though the distinction between the two types is not always recognised. The Scottish
Law Commission has recommended that the 1995 Act be amended to allow pure
e-missives,15 and there could also be secondary legislation under section 8 of the
Electronic Communications Act 2000. One way or another, legislation seems likely.16
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EdinLR Vol 14 pp 284-290
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Actionable Rights and Wrongs: Human Rights
Challenges in AXA General Insurance Ltd
Lord Emslie’s recent opinion in AXA General Insurance Ltd, Ptrs1 comprises 249
paragraphs of thoughtful and well-reasoned argument on the lawfulness of the
Damages (Asbestos-Related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. The decision contains
useful guidance on a number of issues including the parameters of victim status in
terms of article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the extent to
which Acts of the Scottish Parliament, as a sui generis form of subordinate legislation,
are open to judicial review. This note will focus on the two substantive human rights
challenges to the legislation’s competency, made under article 6 and article 1 of the
first protocol to the ECHR. Lord Emslie dismissed each of these challenges, and the
petition as a whole. The petitioners have, however, indicated an intention to appeal.2
A. BACKGROUND
Pleural plaques are scarring to the lung tissue caused by inhalation of asbestos fibres.
They are almost invariably asymptomatic and do not trigger or develop into more
14 See eg J Ley, “Law out of step?” (2009) 54 JLSS Oct/56; E Sinclair, “Never waste a good crisis” (2009) 54
JLSS Nov/56; E Sinclair, “E-missives: it’s time for delivery” (2009) 77 SLG 114; A Duncan, “Concluding
missives in 2009? On your bike” (2009) 103 Greens Property Law Bulletin 5.
15 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (Scot Law Com No 222 (2010), available at
www.scotlawcom.gov.uk) para 34.
16 This note draws on material which appears in K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2009 (2010)
85-89.
1 [2010] CSOH 2, 2010 SLT 179.
2 See Association of British Insurers, “News release: insurers lodge appeal against Scottish
judgment on pleural plaques” 14 Jan 2010, available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/
2010/01/Insurers_lodge_appeal_against_Scottish_judgment_on_pleural_plaques.aspx.
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serious asbestos-related conditions such as mesothelioma. Diagnosis of plaques does,
however, confirm exposure to asbestos, indicating an elevated risk of development of
such conditions, which may be grounds for significant anxiety. Over several decades,
UK indemnity insurers of employers who negligently exposed workers to asbestos
have settled personal injury claims in respect of plaques. Insurers adopted this policy
on the basis of a “commercial decision”3 rather than as the result of any clear authority
as to the legal basis on which plaques might found a claim.4
The position changed two years ago. In Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co
Limited,5 a conjoined group of English test cases, the House of Lords unanimously
affirmed the majority decision of the Court of Appeal in finding that pleural plaques
could not form the basis of a damages action. Scarring which did not cause disability,
disfigurement, or the risk of development into a more serious condition could not,
it was held, amount to a harm for the purposes of the law of tort.6 The Scottish
Parliament responded to this decision with the 2009 legislation, which provides that
pleural plaques, along with pleural thickening and asbestosis, are to be considered as
actionable harms. The petitioners in AXA General Insurance, a group of insurance
companies, argued that this Act had the effect of unlawfully imposing millions of
pounds of additional liabilities upon them.
B. THE ARTICLE 6 CHALLENGE
Article 6 of the ECHR begins: “In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations. . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing”. The contention put
forward by the petitioners was that the 2009 legislation represented an unjustifiable
Parliamentary interference in the determination of the petitioners’ civil rights and
obligations. The scope of this challenge was admitted to be restricted to the several
hundred pleural plaques claims which had been sisted since 2006 pending the
decision in Rothwell. The 2009 Act, it was asserted, directly interfered in the outcome
of these cases. It was additionally contended that this interference would operate to
“‘reconfigure’ past indemnity insurance contracts in such a way as to impose new
liabilities for which premiums were never taken”.7
The background to this challenge was in the nature of a debate between the
parties as to the true purpose of the 2009 legislation. The petitioners’ position was
essentially that Rothwell had been acknowledged by Holyrood as fatal to existing
plaques claims, and the Act had been introduced specifically to prevent that result,
deliberately targeting insurers. The argument for the Scottish government was that
the legislation was designed to resolve uncertainty as to the applicability of Rothwell,
3 Paras 9 and 10.
4 See in England, Sykes v Ministry of Defence, The Times 23 Mar 1984, and in Scotland, Gibson v
McAndrew Wormald & Co Ltd 1998 SLT 562. Neither case turned on this point, however.
5 [2008] 1 AC 281.
6 Lord Hope differed from the other judges in concluding that plaques might be recognised as an injury
or a disease, but since no symptoms resulted, they must be considered de minimis. See paras 38 and 39.
7 AXA General Insurance at para 148.
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a case decided under principles of English law, in Scotland and to give effect to the
legal and political view that pleural plaques should be an actionable wrong.
Lord Emslie concluded from the Strasbourg authorities8 that a successful
challenge required the petitioners to demonstrate:9
(i) that the close involvement which they claimed in pleural plaques litigation should be
held equivalent to party status; (ii) that the outcome of pleural plaques actions should
be deemed decisive for their own civil rights and obligations as indemnity insurers; and
(iii) that the 2009 Act relevantly interfered with judicial determination of such proceedings.
The petitioners were unsuccessful in every element. Two key difficulties emerged.
The first was that, regardless of the extent to which the resolution of the sisted cases
might impact on insurers’ finances, nothing determinative of their own civil rights and
obligations could result. It seems that the “reconfiguration of policies” argument may
have been intended to meet the criterion of direct determination, but Lord Emslie
noted that, like the petitioners (and the writer), he did not find this contention easy to
follow.10 Either the policies covered actionable damage or they did not, and nothing in
the legislation could rewrite the terms of those contracts. Secondly, Lord Emslie was
not satisfied that the 2009 Act was designed to influence directly the determination
of the sisted cases. The purpose of the legislation, on the evidence, was to ensure that
individuals diagnosed with pleural plaques, pleural thickening or asbestosis, whether
in the past or the future, would have an actionable basis for a claim in Scots law.
The retrospective effect of the legislation on the sisted cases was a secondary issue.
It is difficult to imagine an alternative outcome to this challenge when the
nature of the dispute between insurers and the Government is set alongside the
authorities in the area.11 Article 6 cannot operate to prevent a state from introducing
legislation which may impact on ongoing litigation, for, if it did, legislating would be
an impossible task. The cases where a challenge of this kind has found favour almost
inevitably involve existing litigation between the applicant and the state itself in which
the state has used legislation purely and specifically to evade an otherwise inevitable
defeat.12 Although Lord Emslie, probably correctly, placed little significance on the
fact the government was not party to the sisted cases,13 the reality remains that the
battle between the government and insurers here is one of broad legal and political
principle. Indeed, the fact that so many ongoing actions existed in the first place
tends to support rather than undermine this conclusion. The legislation itself provides
8 Although various cases were canvassed, Zielinski and Ors v France (2001) 31 EHRR 19 was clearly the
most influential.
9 AXA General Insurance at para 164.
10 Para 243.
11 The numerous cases referred to by the parties are listed at para 147. Al-Fayed v United Kingdom (1994)
18 EHRR 393 and Perez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 39 are also of interest in this context.
12 The exceptions are App No 16043/03 Achache v France 3 Oct 2006 and App No 67847/01 Lecarpentier
v France 14 Feb 2006. The applicants in these cases were engaged in litigation with quasi-nationalised
French banks, where the virtual party status of the state was easier to make out than in the sisted
plaques actions, although the principle may be of wider application.
13 AXA General Insurance at para 169.
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baldly that plaques, pleural thickening and asbestosis are actionable in Scotland, with
no clarifications or restrictions. The point is of wide social and legal significance. An
attempt to view it solely through the prism of article 6 could only ever be an artificial
construction of the argument, and is evidently not what rights under article 6 were
designed for.
C. THE CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLE 1 PROTOCOL 1
Article 1 protocol 1 protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. This right
can be interfered with by the state where necessary in the public interest, provided
the state action is lawful and proportionate. Two main issues arose in respect of
this challenge. In the first place, what was the nature of the “possession” which the
petitioners alleged was entitled to protection? Secondly, had peaceful enjoyment of
this possession in fact been interfered with by the introduction of the 2009 Act? The
court also considered whether the interference, if any, could be justified on public
interest grounds.
(1) Possessions
Contentious under this head was the petitioners’ submission that the Rothwell
decision was, in itself, an asset of value to insurers. Rothwell, it was argued,
constituted an immunity from pleural plaques claims. Strasbourg jurisprudence, it
was said, indicates that a reasonably-based claim carrying a legitimate expectation of
success is a “possession” within the meaning of article 1 protocol 1. Why, then, should
an immunity carrying a significant economic value not also be considered a possession
in the article 1 protocol 1 sense?14
It is an established principle of ECHR jurisprudence that “possessions” has an
autonomous meaning.15 Although the guidance offered by the case law on the exact
parameters of what may constitute a possession is far from conclusive, it is possible
to identify certain key factors. Thus the purported possession must have an economic
value; and it must have been acquired by the time of the state action, or there must
have been a legitimate expectation of future acquisition which was prevented by state
action.16 Within this framework, it is clear that a court order is a possession, effectively
equivalent to a debt.17 The position of as yet unresolved court actions is somewhat
unclear. The general line is that an ongoing action cannot be a possession: hence
dismissal of an action by the courts is not in itself interference with a possession.18
14 Para 181.
15 App No 33202/96 Beyeler v Italy 5 Jan 2000, accepted domestically in e.g.Wilson v First County Trust
(No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816.
16 The authorities are legion, but assistance may be found in Inze v Austria (1988) 10 EHRR 394; Van
Marle v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 483; Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 309;
and domestically in Adams v Scottish Ministers 2004 SC 665 and Catscratch Limited v City of Glasgow
Licensing Board (No 2) 2002 SLT 503.
17 A recent example is Broniowski v Poland (2006) 43 EHRR 1.
18 Agneessens v Belgium (1988) 58 DR 74; Kopécky v Slovakia (2005) 41 EHRR 43.
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A few exceptions do exist for ongoing claims, but these tend to involve the state as a
party to the litigation in circumstances similar to the article 6 cases discussed above.19
Within this context, Lord Emslie identified a number of difficulties with the
assertion that Rothwell equated to a possession. Chiefly, the decision did not offer
the immunity petitioners claimed. The case was decided under English law, and
whether the same conclusion would be reached using Scots principles was at least
debatable. The agreed evidence in Rothwell might not be replicated in future cases.
The appellate committee had specifically not ruled on the likely success of potential
future contract-based plaques claims. Finally, the decision dealt only with plaques,
not with the pleural thickening or asbestosis which were also identified as actionable
damage by the 2009 Act. Given all the imponderables, it would be inaccurate to
describe Rothwell as representing immunity from future claims which had been
removed by the 2009 legislation. Such immunity had never existed.
More critically, immunity in itself could never amount to a possession. Lord Emslie
noted that “possession” is not wide enough to cover every interest which has an
economic value: the interest has to be proprietary in nature. In other words, the
interest must have been acquired in the sense that property rights can be exercised
in respect of it.20 Immunity from suit cannot be sold, assigned or otherwise disposed
of. Security cannot be granted over it. The idea that immunity might prevent future
impact on the financial standing of insurers is too far removed from the notion of a
proprietary interest to qualify as an article 1 protocol 1 possession.
This interpretation of the Strasbourg case law is undoubtedly correct. Economic
value is not the sole test of possessions, and construing the right in this way would
render it meaningless.21 The importance of proprietary rights has been emphasised
repeatedly both in identifying when a possession is held and in clarifying when the
possession has been lost.22 A claim in which there is a reasonably-based expectation of
success may, uncomfortably, equate to a possession in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
The expectation of a successful defence to a claim will not.
(2) Interference
The petitioners’ second argument focused on their capital resources, which were
unquestionably a “possession”. The 2009 legislation would have the effect of
compelling insurers to pay damages for pleural plaques claims. This, it was argued,
represented an interference with their capital resources.
As with the article 6 challenge, Lord Emslie was not satisfied that the relationship
between the legislation and the impact on the petitioners’ finances was sufficiently
proximate to engage rights under article 1 protocol 1. “A line has to be drawn”,
19 Stran Greek Refineries v Greece (1995) 19 EHRR 293; Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium (1996)
21 EHRR 301.
20 Anheuser Busch v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36.
21 These ideas are paralleled in a very different context in M v Austria (1984) 39 DR 85.
22 The keynote decision of Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 is instructive in this
regard.
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he indicated, “between on the one hand, primary and immediate effects and, on
the other, effects which are only secondary and derivative. The ripples spreading
outwards from a legislative measure cannot be thought to confer or infringe legal
rights to an infinite degree”.23
This conclusion seems entirely consistent with the Strasbourg case law. In
Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden,24 the European Commission on Human Rights
explained that article 1 protocol 1 dealt with “the action whereby the State lays
hand – or authorises a third party to lay hands – on a particular piece of property for
a purpose which is to serve the public interest”.25 The 2009 legislation could not
sensibly be said to “authorise” individuals diagnosed with pleural plaques to withdraw
funds from the petitioners’ capital resources. An action must be successfully pursued
before damages would be awarded. The argument is similar to the article 6 challenge
outlined above, and it fails for broadly the same reason.
(3) Public interest
To bring the human rights arguments to a conclusion, and notwithstanding his earlier
findings, Lord Emslie dealt fully with the petitioners’ assertion that any interference
that might be established with their article 1 protocol 1 rights could not be justified in
the public interest. Without rehearsing the arguments in full, some key points might
be highlighted.
It had already been established that the aim of the legislation was much broader
than the petitioners claimed. With that finding in place, many of the arguments
under this head simply fell away. A legitimate aim had evidently been pursued and
insurers had not been targeted. Lord Emslie was understandably unimpressed with
the suggestion that legislating to reverse Rothwell, if the legislation even had that
effect, was outrageous or irrational. The speeches of the appellate committee suggest
that decision was reached with difficulty and by a very slender margin. In summing
up, Lord Emslie notes:26
[A]wards of damages against negligent employers, at appropriate levels and under settled
rules, cannot be thought to constitute an unwarranted or disproportionate end result. If
that is right, alleged regulatory sterilisation of the petitioners’ reserves can in my view be no
better placed . . .
This conclusion seems entirely in keeping with the Strasbourg approach to
proportionality.
D. CONCLUSION
With the clarification offered by Lord Emslie’s findings as to the fundamental purpose
of the 2009 Act, it seems that insurers will have marked difficulty in mounting a
23 Para 196.
24 (1982) 29 DR 76.
25 At 82.
26 AXA General Insurance at para 225.
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successful appeal. Regardless of the ECHR article in question, an effective challenge
must concern clear violation of a person’s rights. If the legislation in question is
designed to clarify a broader point of legal principle, then it is difficult to imagine
how such an individual violation could be found to exist.
Regardless of the view taken on the dismissal of the petition, the judgment is
encouraging in its treatment of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Both the parties and
the court made thorough and thoughtful use of the authorities in areas where there
has, as yet, been little opportunity for domestic exploration. In that sense, it may be
that the appeal already marked will prove beneficial to us all.
Frankie McCarthy
University of Glasgow
EdinLR Vol 14 pp 290-294
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The Scottish DNA Database and the Criminal
Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill
The collection and retention of DNA samples is universally seen as crucial for
purposes of criminal investigation and prosecution, as a means of excluding innocent
suspects and of exonerating the wrongfully convicted. However, there is less
consistency across jurisdictions on the question of whose DNA should be obtained
by the state and for how long it should be stored. In Scotland, DNA samples may
at present be obtained from anyone arrested, and then retained indefinitely after
conviction in the criminal courts or for limited periods following acquittal for certain
serious offences. The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill, currently before
the Scottish Parliament,1 proposes to extend this to allow retention of DNA data
obtained from children who have committed sexual or violent offences and who are
being dealt with by the children’s hearings system. The Bill also articulates explicitly
the permitted uses of retained DNA data.
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN SCOTLAND
The existing law relating to DNA collection, retention, use and destruction is
contained in sections 18-20 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.2 Section
18 permits the collection of bodily samples, from which DNA profiles may be
1 The Bill was introduced on 5 March 2009 and passed Stage 1 on 26 November 2009. For
details of progress, and the text of the Bill, see http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/24-
CrimJustLc/index.htm.
2 As amended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 and the Police, Public Order and Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act 2006.
